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Abstract. This article describes the construct of personality and identifies problems of the construct for
application to viable personnel security programs on land, on and under the seas, in the sky, and in
space.
Think of it this way. One’s perception could embrace one thing only or more than one thing at any
moment in time. And that one thing could be everything, something, or nothing. As well, the more than
one thing being perceived could be combinations of everythings, somethings, or nothings. The sky and
beyond are the limits.
This rather abstract and, perhaps, abstruse introduction suggests that any individual person, some
people, or all people could—some or all of the time—or could not—some or all of the time—perceive in
such a manner so that the kinds and numbers of perceptions might be quite different than how they
generally are thought to be perceived. It might even be the case that there are people who perceive in a
radically different fashion—e.g., a fashion wherein there is no construct of person, no construct of self
versus other, no construct of them versus us. Such people, however, are either extremely proficient at
acting as if they perceive like others believe that people perceive or, perhaps, correctly believe that
people who perceive in a manner that is different than how they perceive are unusually inadequate in
perceiving that the former sort of person perceives in such a manner. Here it is interesting to note that
there could even be people who believe that people perceive in a particular manner and who
concurrently hold the belief that people do not perceive in the same particular manner.
So, before we take the plunge and look at something called personality, we must at least realize that this
something may be nothing more than a language convention corresponding to some perceptual
content—a convention that may be, in turn, convenient, inconvenient, or inert as to seeming to
understand and making our way in the world. And we must realize that as far as we are aware of
ourselves and something outside of ourselves, the very notion that there is a person or people to whom
something called personality would be applied is only one of many abstract notions—each vying for
perceptual prepotency and existential constituence as the core to an understanding of the world.
Anyway, in the world of academic psychology—a world in which people are formally sanctioned by a
society as having special competence even if they may not have such competence—and in the world of
lay psychology—a world in which people are not formally sanctioned by a society as having special
competence even if they have such competence—personality most often denotes something
psychological that makes a person that person as opposed to some other person. Here psychology and
psychological comprise thoughts, emotions, motivations, and behaviors (cf. Alexander, 1990).
Cognitive components of personality include, not only what is thought, but also how, when, and where
thoughts occur. Sensation, perception, and fantasy also are examples of thought. Thought components
also can be characterized by their types of logic, rationality, and association. It is even posited that
thoughts can be unconscious which means that one can plausibly take credit for having all thoughts
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good and bad or, more narcissistically, for all thoughts one wants to have including those thoughts that
one doesn’t want to have but finds some sort of gain in owning up to having them.
Emotional components of personality include what are commonly referred to as feelings, nothing more
than feelings, in all their content dimensions from happy to sad to loving to hating. Emotional
components also include the degree of arousal or quiescence and the lability of emotional content.
And, again, emotions may be unconscious according to some academic and lay searchers of the
psychological truth—a reality that, if real, renders one helpless against accusations of emotional
betrayal and vacuity by our friends and enemies alike, for they may claim knowledge of us that we seem
not to know. In addition, there are even thoughts about emotions and their expression that either or
both are good, or bad, or indifferent in and of themselves. Sometimes, these thoughts even have
gender-linked content so that emotional expression in males and in females is good or bad, dependent
on situation, society, culture, or specific magic moments.
Motivational components of personality include the purposes—sometimes labeled as goals—of the
varying components of personality including other motivations. Beyond the notion of unconscious
motivations, there is a raging philosophical controversy on whether motivations are ultimately
motivational—in other words, whether motivations are themselves the purposes and goals of human
psychology or are mere expressions of human psychology without necessarily being constituted as
purposes or goals or suggesting that there are any such things at all. To suggest that there may be no
purposes and goals to life strikes such terror into many people that there is a research tradition in
psychology labeled terror management that is a foundation for attempts to make predictions about
aspects of human personality when the salience of confrontation with life as a meaningless and
unpredictable void is increased. It may also be noted that it is politically incorrect in many academic
circles to assume that life, history, and even individual people have a purpose, a goal, or even a coherent
meaning. This is certainly not a comforting thought in developing management strategies in
organizations.
Behavioral components of personality include both external and internal acts—the latter even including
the beating of the heart, covert kinesthetic movements, and neurotransmitter and hormonal secretion.
There is at least one school of thought that behavior is the only thing that really matters when
addressing personality—that the other aforementioned personality components are apocryphal
remnants of thought (even if thought as an apocryphal remnant of thought is, well, thoughtless), that
they lack valid ontological status, or that the other alleged personality constituents are irrelevant to
personality. There also are schools of thought that certain levels of analysis of personality are more
important to personality than others. For example, some formally sanctioned and lay psychologists
believe that variants of biological or social substrates of personality are the be-all-and-end-all of
understanding people. Often there is a very high positive correlation between the area of socially
sanctioned expertise with which an academic is remunerated for services and the belief in a particular
be-all-and-end-all.
Although the above four components commonly constitute something called personality, the question
remains whether personality is a useful mode of thinking about people; whether it is only a useful mode
of thinking about people; whether it has some ontological validity irrespective of being useful; or
whether we are fated to enter the familiar philosophical conundrums of entertaining the notions that
we are only brains in a vat, that we are running a doomed race against the demon possibility of doubt
about whether we rally exist, or of being unable to differentiate between being asleep and awake—the
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last a practical matter affecting many academics who lecture throughout the world (cf. Elms, 1994;
Runyan, 1997).
To posit that personality pertains to something psychological that makes that person that person as
opposed to someone else, personality theorists—whether our formally credentialed and socially
sanctioned experts on personality or lay psychologists that comprise all people (and, indeed, this may
well include all people including the sanctioned experts) who employ a personality construct—usually
mean the following.
First, there is something about each person that is shared with all other people that makes each person
a person as opposed to someone or something else. Second, there is something about each person that
is shared with some other people. Third, there is something about each person that is shared with no
one else.
Now, one might assume that only what is shared with no one else qualifies as personality in that
personality pertains to what makes each person that person as opposed to someone else. However,
what is shared with no one else is not only just the isolated aspects of uniqueness but also how what is
shared with all others and some others are integrated or not completely integrated together and with
those very isolated aspects of uniqueness. In fact, the very notion of isolated aspects of uniqueness is
questionable because the person as person seems to be innately intradependent and interdependent
with other psychological aspects and other people respectively.
However, personality may be but an example of language usage and associated cognition that is shared
by members of a social population. Even the shared language usage may mask covert differences in
associated cognitions among users of the personality construct. Thus, shared language usage and
shared and different cognitions about something called personality may themselves constitute all of
personality or at least an important aspect of it. Moreover, it may well be that the concatenation of
cognitions about something called personality that characterizes various components of a social
population exemplifies a false consciousness, awareness, or phenomenology. In this sense, what people
believe about people encapsulated in the construct of personality bears no necessary correspondence
to optimal utility in achieving people’s purposes and goals—even if it seems to. What’s more, the belief
in personality may facilitate one’s exploitation by other people with significant political, social, cultural,
and economic power (cf. Sloan, 2001).
In any case, the denotation of personality as something psychological that makes that person that
person as opposed to someone else has a number of difficulties and complexities hat have been alluded
to above and will be elaborated upon below. These present a huge challenge to space security
authorities seeking to minimize psychological threats to security.
Personality, Language, and Reality. Beyond the hypotheses of personality as a mere language
construction and of personality’s construction and constructed components as unique in meaning for
each and every person is the additional difficulty of the compatibility of language and reality. Some
people posit that language and reality are identical in that reality is language dependent and can only be
constructed and construed through language. Other people posit that language is as one with
perception and is the tool one ultimately employs to seek some asymptotic approximation of reality.
Still other people posit the identity of language and reality but that this reality mandates nothing
necessarily about whether there is such a thing as reality or what this reality might be or be like—i.e.,
whether there is such a thing as a thing in itself. And yet others posit that the relationship between
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language and reality is unknowable because the infinite choices on some continuum running from
holistically to atomistically constructing reality are devoid of valid criteria bearing on what to choose.
Language may be the only perspective outside of which one cannot escape to analyze. This existential
fate—as with the enigma that nonsense is the only kind of sense one can sense—does not augur well for
one embarked on a journey of enlightenment towards an endpoint of understanding, predicting and
influencing people in the space security world.
Theories of Personality. Still, a significant and hallowed research tradition in academic psychology is the
construction of macro-theories of personality (Young-Bruehl, 1994). Each constructor of a macro-theory
purports to identify and expound upon that theme which is most salient in understanding what makes
people people. Individual differences in people are explained as variations of the salient theme(s). Yet
the salient theme(s) may well suggest more about the constructor’s personality including the
constructor’s personal beliefs about people masquerading as esteemed professional opinion than about
the people to be described, explained, or understood. One often is left with the intuition that there are
infinite variants of elements within a stream of consciousness or abstractions from such elements that
could as well qualify for personality themes. Much as many readers of Finnegan’s Wake and even
Ulysses are left with huge leaps to approximate the constructor’s meanings, one may face various
personality theories with huge leaps of faith still falling short of validating various salient themes
championed by a personality theorist.
Numbers of Integrated Components. Related to the infinite choices on some continuum running from
holistically to atomistic constructing reality are the four classes of personality components—viz.,
cognition, emotional, motivational, and behavioral. The four classes could as well be two or seven or
ninety nine and a half. They can interrelate and be integrated in many different ways. Different classes
of components and elements of these components also can differ in their significance and salience for
different people in the context of all aspects of psychological functioning. Time- and cost-effective
methods to assess all these differences for even one person—let alone many people—are probably not
an option based on today’s state-of-the-art research in academic psychology.
It is the very choice of attempting to seek the truth that may be the culprit behind the fool’s errand of
identifying the right number of integrated personality components. Perhaps, all that can be done is to
offer up layers and layers of meaning that may or may not resonate with the reader and potential
acolyte of a personality theory. In fact, one would still be left with an even more dire complexity: the
confrontation of meanings from the constructor of personality theory and those from the many readers
of such theory.
Personality as Interpersonal. Personality—beyond denoting what psychologically makes a person that
person as opposed to some other—seems premised on a construct that is individual as opposed to
social. In other words, personality is described as something possessed by a person, manifested by a
person, and characterizing a person only in some acontextual living space—even if one is attempting to
ascribe something social about an individual.
Yet, can any psychological aspect of a person be truly divorced from that person’s interactions with
others? Even when physically alone, a person is accompanied by other people in cognition, emotion,
motivation, and behavior. Perhaps it is language that is the source of inadequate meaning constraining
and interpersonal analysis. And this becomes even more of an Issue when interpersonal is broadened as
appropriate to encompass interobject wherein object includes one’s perceptions.
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A prescription for personality assessment in the service of space security would be to focus on an
individual’s interpersonal style towards other personality types as well as traits presumed internal to
that individual.
Personality as Situational. To continue with the contextual nature of personality, one might well note
that not only is personality intimately related to the interpersonal but also to the situational. And
situational denotes not only the immediate physical, psychological, and social and cultural milieu, but
also long-term historical and even evolutionary trends.
Again, the notion of personality as something presumed to be internal to the person is highly suspect,
incomplete, and misleading. When attempting to understand, predict, and influence a person, one then
becomes at the mercy of events beyond one’s control and even beyond one’s apprehension.
Personality as Conscious, Preconscious, and Unconscious. It may well be that awareness and personality
intersect but are not completely contiguous. In other words, some of personality may be unknown to
the person being characterized by that personality. Briefly, that of which a person is aware is conscious.
That of which a person is not aware but can be relatively easily is preconscious. That of which a person
is not aware and cannot be or can be only with very significant degrees of difficulty is unconscious.
It is this last that is most problematic. For how can one show that something psychological—especially
intrapsychic—about a person that is unknown to that person can be known to someone else about that
person? This question is complicated by at least two types of knowing. The first type denotes believing
that one knows something, the latter actually knowing something whether one believes it or is aware of
the belief or of what the belief is about. And if one can know something without being aware of it, one
might end up with an absurd social configuration of psychological experts dueling about the personality
of an individual even as they may know most about that individual in an unconscious manner.
Perhaps, it is the case that the unconscious is but a robust stalking horse for motives in others about
oneself that are not unknown but are unspeakable. These motives would then have a power that
recedes into nothingness once spoken of—much as so-called primitive and primeval beliefs about losing
one’s soul once one’s words or physiognomy are captured on text or by photograph dissipates once it
becomes public that the soul seems to have survived.
Personality as Inescapable. In fact, one might be puzzled over how the personality of one person can be
assessed by another. The another also presumably can be characterized by a personality that makes
that another another as opposed to the person being assessed by another. How can the another escape
this personality to assess the person without that person serving only as a vehicle for the manifestation
or expression of the another’s personality? And when does consensus or divergence of the opinions of
many anothers about a person bear mostly on the personalities of the anothers or on the person? This
last point again bears on the competing meanings of constructors of personality theory and readers of
theory who may nothing more or nothing less than constructors of theory through their readings of
theory.
Personality as Temporal and as Quantitatively Ambiguous. The personality construct almost always is
assumed to have temporal qualities. That is, aspects of personality may change with time irrespective of
interpersonal and situational elements. Yet when personality is assessed not to have changed over
some interval, does one assume that personality has, indeed, not changed? Or has the assessment
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technique or approach not picked up the change? And if personality is assessed to have changed, how
does one differentiate change from an inaccurate measurement of two or more temporal states of
personality that have actually remained constant?
In fact, the very constancy of measurement through time often is assumed to support the reliability and
even the validity of a personality assessment instrument, while inconstancy is assumed to support
neither! This bears on the contention of many academics touched by the still lively (in the United
States) rubric of postmodernism that each person can be concurrently and through time characterized
by multiple selves—a nightmare for any human resources or security manager in an organization.
Personality as Cross-Cultural. Concepts such as national character, ethnic character, ethnicity, racial
profiling, and the like bear on the notion that there are group differences in personality that are much
more significant than individual differences within a group. Yet one might note that each individual may
be said to reside within an at least partially unique culture—regardless of shared cultural comments—
through at least partially unique personality components. Added difficulty and complexity relates to
similar personality assessment procedures being construed differently by different assessees and
assessors—all of whom reside within at least partially unique cultures.
So the problem one is left with becomes how to traverse from the crude simplicity of cross-cultural
psychology as the psychology of various artificially constructed groups—each based on skin color,
geographical origins, ethnic practices, and so on—to the dynamically complex and rich cross-cultural
psychology of various selves within, between, and among each person. Profiling systems that support
space security must address and resolve this problem.
Personality as Non-Psychological via Non-Narration. In this discussion, although personality has been
deemed psychological by definition, most professional notions of personality—be they macro-theories
or particularistic, elemental depictions—severely constrain the psychology that is mined via a limited
combination of methodological implements. Life stories and life histories as conceived and perceived by
persons being assessed, self-valued life themes and occurrences, and other richly textured aspects of
human awareness seem less significant for the personality constructions of the experts, more so for
laypersons. This finding suggests an unfortunate set of narratives for formal and advanced psychological
education and the application of so-called psychological knowledge. In essence, the person becomes
lost via personality to the detriment of security programs.
A Conclusion. It thus appears that applied quests in the real world based on the personality construct
face huge challenges. So, for example, addressing sabotage, espionage, and terrorism through
preventing, minimizing, and managing these threats from, as opposed to merely to members of one’s
organization, must occur with care. Addressing such problematic behaviors is a matter of security.
Addressing them through understanding, predicting, and influencing people is a matter of personality.
The greater challenge is forging a syncretic product of the two—personnel security. (See Alexander, I.E.
(1990). Personology: Method and content in personality assessment and psychobiography. Durham, NC,
USA: Duke University Press; Elms, A.C. (1994). Uncovering lives: The uneasy alliance of biography and
psychology. London: Oxford University Press; Perplexed and circumplexed: The structure of social
behavior in a political world. (September 26, 1997.) IBPP, 3(9), http://security.pr.erau.edu; Runyan, W.
(1997). Studying lives: Psychobiography and the conceptual structure of personality psychology. In R.
Hogan & J. A. Johnson (Ed.). Handbook of personality psychology. (pp. 41-69). San Diego, CA, US:
Academic Press, Inc.; Sloan, T. (Ed.). (2001). Critical psychology: Voices for change. New York, NY, US:
St. Martin's Press, Inc.; The construct of personality: Implications for psychological profiles, Background
6
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol14/iss22/2

6

Editor: Personnel Security

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
investigations, and Intelligence Agent Preassessment and Evaluation. (July 31, 1998). IBPP, 5(5),
http://security.pr.erau.edu.; Young-Bruehl, E. (1994). A history of Freud's biographies. In M. S. Micale
& R. Porter (Eds.). Discovering the history of psychiatry. (pp. 157-173). New York: Oxford University
Press.) (Keywords: Personality, Personnel Security.)
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